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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 17625 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH, 
DISMISSING DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM AS 
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Robert M. McRae, for 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
319 West First South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Def.end.ants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
17625 
In this action defendants, as counterclaimants, seek 
to recover, pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimants Statute, 
Section 57-6-1 et. seg. Utah Code Annotated, for improvements, 
made to real property which was the subject matter of prior 
proceedings between these same parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice 
by the Honorable David Sam, Judge for the Fourth District Court 
in Uintah County, State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, respondent, seeks affirmation of the 
Order of Dismissal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of an earlier action between 
these same parties wherein ownership of the real property, same 
as is involved in the present action and known generally as the 
"Moss Ranch," was contested. In the earlier action, upon a trial 
before a jury in 1978, it was determined that defendants had 
acted wilfully and maliciously against plaintiff, Ute-Cal, in 
wrongfully obtaining a deed to said property in March, 1974. 
It was further determined that plaintiff was the rightful owner 
of this property. These findings were upheld on appeal. Ute~~ 
Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980). 
After defendants had wrongfully obtained the deed to 
Moss Ranch, and while in possession of same, they allegedly made 
certain improvements upon the property. Said improvements are 
now the basis of defendants' counterclaim pursuant to Utah's 
Occupying Claimant statute, Section 57-6-1 et. seg. Utah Code 
Annotated. 
Defendants' counterclaim was separated from the 1978 
trial on the issues of ownership and damages related thereto, and 
reserved for later determination. Plaintiff filed a motion to 
dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that defendants' wilfull 
and malicious misconduct against plaintiff's interest in the 
property precluded any claim pursuant to Utah's Occupying Claimant 
statute. In February, 1981, an order granted by Honorable David 
Sam, Judge in the fourth District Court for Uintah County, 
dismissed defendants' counterclaim. 
Plaintiff seeks an affirmation of the lower Court's 
Order of Dismissal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS, AS COUNTERCLAIMANTS, ARE PRECLUDED FROM 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION UNDER THE OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS STATUTE BY 
THEIR PRIOR WILFUL AND MALICIOUS MISCONDUCT IN ACQUIRING TITLE TO 
THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LAWSUIT. 
(a) To maintain a claim pursuant to the Utah Occupying 
Claimants statute, a claimant must first establish (1) that he had 
color of title to the real property in question, and (2) that he, 
in good faith, made valuable improvements thereon. Section 57-6-1 
Utah Code Annotated. A liberal definition of who is deel'1ed to have 
color of title, for purposes of the Occupying Claimant statute, is 
provided in Section 57-6-4; "good faith," however, is not specifi-
cally defined for purposes of the statute. 
In 41 Am. Jur. 2d §17, at 492, it is suggested that 
for purposes of such statutes as here in question, "good faith 
means simply a reasonable and honest belief of the occupant in 
his right or title, or, in other words, his freedom from a design 
to defraud the party having the better title.n This position is 
consistent with Utah case law. An instruction on good faith 
upheld in Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180, 
at 1182 (_1915), and cited again as a fair statement of Utah law by 
Justice Crockett in Erickson v. Stoker, 120 Utah 653, 237 P. 2d 
1012, at 1013 (1951), stated that the question of good faith will 
depend on whether »at the time all the improvements were being made 
the defendant honestly believed it owned the property." 
The affidavit presented by defendant SATHER asserts 
that at the time the improvements were made he believed he was the 
owner of the property in question. Defendants also assert, properly 
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that whether such subjective belief was "honest" and sufficient 
to establish "good faith" is a question of fact to be determined 
by all the facts and circumstances of the case. In the case at 
bar, however, the most crucial fact, determined in a prior 
proceeding between these parties and determinative of the issue 
here, was that the defendants had acquired title by wilful and 
malicious misconduct against plaintiff and plaintiff's interest 
in said property. See Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 
605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980). While defendants might subjectively 
believe they could and did obtain ownership of the property by 
such wrongful means, that belief in these circumstances should 
not be construed to be an "honest belief" nor sufficient to raise 
the issue of good faith. 
One who acts in good faith acts with honest intentions. 
The defendants' assertion, that despite having acquired title by 
wrongful means in 1974, it was with an honest belief that they 
were the rightful owners of said property when they made improve-
ments in 1975, is on its face inconsistent with honest intention 
or good faith. Defendants, however, assert that there is yet a 
question of fact regarding good faith, that in effect the above 
inconsistency can be explained by a change in circumstances. 
The affidavit presented by defendant SATHER claims 
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the improvements and did not 
object to their being made. 
addresses this point. In 
There is no Utah case that specific3liY 
Reimann v. Baum, 203 P. 2d 387 (Utah '.~ 19 
however, the Utah Supreme Court did address a situation where the 
defendant's explanation of good faith was based on a belief that ' 
-4-
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action on the land had been abandoned. The action had been filed 
but plaintiffs did not bring it to trial for four years. The Utah 
supreme Court indicated that the defendant's belief that the action 
had been abandoned was insufficient to establish good faith. 
Reimann, at 391. 
In the case at bar defendants' position is not based 
on any affirmative act or statement by the plaintiff, but merely 
on an alleged failure to object to defendants' activities on the 
land in question. Even if defendants' contention is accepted as 
true, that is not such a change in circumstances that would 
entitle a reasonable person to honestly believe he had obtained 
rightful ownership by wrongful means. 
(b) It would be contrary to the intent and purpose 
of Utah's Occupying Clailnant's Statute to allow a defendant who 
had acquired title by wilful and malicious misconduct against 
plaintiff, to maintain a claim for value of improvements against 
same plaintiff. "The doctrine underlying the Occupying Claimant 
Statute arose from equity's attempt to make some fair and reason-
able adjustment of a mistake made in good faith." Alleman v. Miner, 
10 Utah 2d 356, 353 P. 2d 463 (_1960). The proposition that a 
mistake in good faith can follow from wilful misconduct in acquiring 
title, is implausible at best. He who seeks equity should do 
equity. A claim pursuant to an Occupying Claimant Statute "sounds 
in equity." Reimann v. Baum 203 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1949). 
In the early case of Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 
47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180 (~915), the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
wherein the record it appeared that there was a deliberate 
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attempt to deprive the plaintiff of his property, an entire lack 
of good faith was indicated. Doyle, at 1183. Very recently the 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that mere notice of an adverse claim 
will preclude an occupant from recovering the value of improvem9~ 
made subsequent to such notice; apparently this rule applies even 
though the occupant might have an honest belief that the adverse 
claim was without merit. See Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. 
Mills, 590 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 1979). Even though Justice Crockett 
dissented from the broad rule stated in Hidden Meadows, he notes 
that the protection of the Occupying Claimants statute is only 
for one who has a "bona fide claim." Hidden Meadows, at 1251. 
It is difficult to conceive a claim that is less "bona fide" th~ 
one based on a wilful and wrongful acquisition of title against 
the interest of the very same plaintiff the claim is raised agains~. 
(_c) Defendants' contention is that there is a genuine 
and material question of fact on the issue of good faith, and 
therefore it was error for the trial court to dismiss the 
defendants' counterclaim without a trial. This contention is 
based to a large extent on Cl) the defendants' proposition that 
the jury finding of wilful and malicious misconduct in 1974, 
"would not necessarily be the same or be controlling with respect 
to matters occuring" in 1975, and (.2) the plaintiff's alleged 
failure to object to defendants' activities in making improvements. 
The crucial fact, as noted in argument above, is that 
defendants acquired title by wilful and malicious misconduct 
against plaintiff. That issue was fully litigated and reviewed 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Even if plaintiff did not object to 
-6-
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the making of improvements by defendants, defendants are precluded 
by their prior misconduct from maintaining that they were acting 
in good faith by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
It is well-settled that the purpose of a summary 
judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial 
when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party 
ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Co. 
v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1975). In the case at bar the 
defendants should not be entitled to re-litigate the issue of how 
they acquired title and the prior finding of the jury on that 
issue is determinative of the issue of good faith. There is no 
genuine question of fact regarding good faith and the Order of 
Dismissal was proper. "[I]f the party being ruled against could 
not prevail when the facts are looked at most favorably for his 
position, then summary judgment should be granted." Grow v. 
Marwick Development, Inc. 621 P. 2d 1249 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
In the present case defendants are precluded, by 
their prior misconduct against plaintiff, from maintaining that 
they were acting in good faith. Good faith is an essential element 
in a claim pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Statute. As 
such, defendants could not prevail on their favor. An Order of 
Dismissal was both prudent and proper in that the court and parties 
involved are thereby saved the expense and trouble of a trial at 
which the defendants could not prevail. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the lower court's 
Order of Dismissal be affirmed and its costs. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Robert for 
McRAE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UTE CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
319 West First South, Suite A ' 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoi~ 
postage prepaid, to Cullen Y. Christensen of CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR& 
MOODY, attorneys for defendants, 55 East Center Street, P.O. Box H61 
Provo, Utah 84601, on this -a day of July, }981. \i 
Zk)~ 
Robert~ ' 
! 
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